Buscar en Reportes de Crédito de Sudan
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Ibrahim Gibril OMER
| Nombre : | Ibrahim Gibril OMER | | Alias : | Abu WAFI; Ibrahim OMER | | País : | sd | | Sanciones : | "The Sudan (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2020 - The Secretary of State has reasonable grounds to suspect that Ibrahim Gibril OMER ('Abu Wafi') is an involved person under the Sudan (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2020 because he is or has been involved in a relevant activity, namely being responsible for and providing support for the commission of violations of international humanitarian law in Sudan, through his role as Major of the Rapid Support Forces and Commander for the North Darfur section of the Rapid Support Forces, and through his association with Gedo Hamdan Ahmed, an involved person. - The Secretary of State has reasonable grounds to suspect that Ibrahim Gibril OMER (“Abu Wafi”) is an involved person under the Sudan (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2020 because he is or has been involved in a relevant activity, namely being responsible for and providing support for the commission of violations of international humanitarian law in Sudan, through his role as Major of the Rapid Support Forces and Commander for the North Darfur section of the Rapid Support Forces, and through his association with Gedo Hamdan Ahmed, an involved person. - 2026-10-26"; description_identifier: disqualification under sanctions regulation - section: 3A - act: sanctions anti money laundering act 2018 - 2026-10-26 | | Fuente : | UK Companies House Disqualified Directors; UK FCDO Sanctions List | | Fecha : | 2026-10-28T00:33:04 |
Ashraf Seed Ahmed Al-Cardinal
| Nombre : | Ashraf Seed Ahmed Al-Cardinal | | Alias : | AL-CARDINAL, Ashraf Seed Ahmed; Al-Cardinal; Asharaf SEED AHMED; Asharaf Seed Ahmed; Asharaf Seed Ahmed ALI; Ashiraf SEEDAHMED; Ashiraf Seed Ahmed ALI; Ashiraf Seedahmed; Ashraf ALI; Ashraf Hussein ALI; Ashraf Hussein Ali; Ashraf Said Ahmed HUSSEIN; Ashraf Said Ahmed Hussein; Ashraf Said Ahmed Hussein ALI; Ashraf Sayed ALI; Ashraf Sayed Ali; Ashraf Seed Ahmed HUSSEIN; Ashraf Seed Ahmed Hussein; Ashraf Seed Ahmed Hussein ALI; Ashraf Seedahmed Hussein ALI; Ashraf Seedahmed Hussein Ali; Ashraff SEED AHMED; Ashraff Seed Ahmed; Ashraff Seed Ahmed ALI | | Fecha de nacimiento : | 1957-01-01; 1957-01-31 | | País : | ae; gb; sd; ss | | Dirección : | 1 College Yard, Winchester Avenue, London NW6 7UA, England; 207 Jersey Road, Osterley, London TW7 4RE; Dubai; Dubai, United Arab Emirates; LONDON NW6 7UA, ENGLAND | | Sanciones : | GLOMAG - Executive Order 13818 (Global Magnitsky); Reciprocal - Active - 2019-10-11; The Global Anti-Corruption Sanctions Regulations 2021 - Ashraf Seed Ahmed Hussein Ali, widely known as AL-CARDINAL, has been involved in serious corruption in South Sudan involving the misappropriation of state property to his benefit and the benefit of others. He has been the beneficiary of commitments from the State which constituted the improper diversion of significant amounts of government revenues and funds. His actions facilitated or provided support for serious corruption that has caused damage to South Sudan’s public finances and contributed to ongoing instability and conflict. - 2021-04-26; description_identifier: disqualification under sanctions regulation - section: 3A - act: sanctions anti money laundering act 2018 - 2025-04-09 | | Fuente : | UK Companies House Disqualified Directors; UK FCDO Sanctions List; US OFAC Press Releases; US OFAC Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) List; US SAM Procurement Exclusions; US Trade Consolidated Screening List (CSL) | | Fecha : | 2026-07-16T07:17:05 |
Al Rowad Real Estate Development
| Nombre : | Al Rowad Real Estate Development | | Alias : | AL ROWAD REAL ESTATE DEVELOPMENT; ALROWAD COMPANY; ALROWAD FOR REAL ESTATE; ALROWAD FOR REAL ESTATE DEVELOPMENT COMPANY; ALROWAD REAL ESTATE DEVELOPMENT COMPANY; ALROWAD RESIDENTIAL COMPOUND; Al-Rowad Real Estate Development; Alrowad Company; Alrowad For Real Estate; Alrowad For Real Estate Development Company; Alrowad REAL ESTATE DEVELOPMENT COMPANY; Alrowad Real Estate Development Company; Alrowad Residential Compound; Alrowad for Real Estate Development Company; PIONEER COMPANY FOR REAL ESTATE DEVELOPMENT CO. LTD.; PIONEER REAL ESTATE DEVELOPMENT CO. LTD. OF SUDAN-SAUDI ARABIA; Pioneer Company For Real Estate Development Co. Ltd. Of Sudan-Saudi Arabia; Pioneer Company for Real Estate Development Co. LTD.; Pioneer Real Estate Development Co. LTD. of Sudan-Saudi Arabia; RUWWAD AL-QABIDAH COMPANY; RUWWAD REAL ESTATE DEVELOPMENT; Ruwwad Al-Qabidah Company; Ruwwad Real Estate Development; אל רוואד נכסים ופיתוח; الرواد للتطوير العقاري; شركة الرواد للتطوير العقاري; شركة الرواد للتطوير العمراني; شركة الرواد مجمع الرواد السكني شركة الرواد القابضة | | País : | sd | | Dirección : | WEST KHARTOUM; West Khartoum; West Khartoum Sudan | | Sanciones : | Reciprocal - Active - 2022-05-24; SDGT - Executive Order 13224 (Terrorism); U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY - הכרזה על ארגון טרור לפי חוק המאבק בטרור - התשע''ו-2016 - A Sudanese company that was established in 2010 and merged several other HAMAS companies in Sudan. Qafisheh was the decision maker on hiring employees in the company and was involved in its financial activities. - 2022-08-17 | | Teléfono : | 249183492201 | | Fuente : | Israel Terrorists Organizations and Unauthorized Associations lists; Taiwan Strategic High-Tech Commodities Entity List; US OFAC Press Releases; US OFAC Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) List; US SAM Procurement Exclusions; US Trade Consolidated Screening List (CSL) | | Fecha : | 2026-10-06T12:47:00 |
Abdelbagi Dahab TALBO
| Nombre : | Abdelbagi Dahab TALBO | | Alias : | Abdelbagi TALBO | | País : | sd | | Sanciones : | "The Sudan (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2020 - The Secretary of State has reasonable grounds to suspect that Abdelbagi Dahab TALBO is an involved person under the Sudan (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2020 because is or has been involved in a relevant activity, namely he is responsible for or provided support for the commission of violations of international humanitarian law in Sudan, including rape and other forms of sexual and gender-based violence. He is a Colonel in the Rapid Support Forces who was present at the 'takeover' of Zamzam Internally Displaced Persons Camp in April 2025 where there were numerous accounts of conflict-related sexual violence perpetrated by members of the Rapid Support Forces. - The Secretary of State has reasonable grounds to suspect that Abdelbagi Dahab TALBO is an involved person under the Sudan (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2020 because is or has been involved in a relevant activity, namely he is responsible for or provided support for the commission of violations of international humanitarian law in Sudan, including rape and other forms of sexual and gender-based violence. He is a Colonel in the Rapid Support Forces who was present at the “takeover” of Zamzam Internally Displaced Persons Camp in April 2025 where there were numerous accounts of conflict-related sexual violence perpetrated by members of the Rapid Support Forces. - 2026-10-26"; description_identifier: disqualification under sanctions regulation - section: 3A - act: sanctions anti money laundering act 2018 - 2026-10-26 | | Fuente : | UK Companies House Disqualified Directors; UK FCDO Sanctions List | | Fecha : | 2026-10-29T00:33:07 |
Harakat Sawa’d Misr
| Nombre : | Harakat Sawa’d Misr | | Alias : | Arms of Egypt Movement; HAMMS; HASAM; HASAM (Harakat Sawa'd Misr); HASM; HASM MOVEMENT; HASSAM; HASSM; Hamms; Harakah Sawa'id Misr; Harakah Sawa’d Misr; Harakat Hasm; Harakat Sawa'd Misr; Harikat Souaid Misr; Hasam; Hasm; Hasm Movement; Hassam; Hassm; MOVEMENT OF EGYPT'S FOREARMS; Movement of Egypt's Arms; Movement of Egypt's Forearms; The Hasam Movement; the Hassm Movement; the Movement of Egypt's Arms; the Movement of Egypt's Forearms and the Arms of Egypt Movement | | País : | eg; sd; tr | | Dirección : | Beheira Egypt; Beni Suef Egypt; Cairo Egypt; Damietta Egypt; Egypt; Fayoum Egypt; Giza Egypt; Qalyubia Egypt; Sudan; Turkey | | Sanciones : | ; 2021-01-14; SDGT - INA - Executive Order 13224 (Terrorism) | | Fuente : | Canadian Listed Terrorist Entities; PermID Open Data; Taiwan Strategic High-Tech Commodities Entity List; UK Proscribed Terrorist Groups or Organizations; US Department of State Foreign Terrorist Organizations; US OFAC Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) List; US Trade Consolidated Screening List (CSL) | | Fecha : | 2026-09-16T00:48:01 |
Awatif Ahmed Seed Ahmed Mohamed
| Nombre : | Awatif Ahmed Seed Ahmed Mohamed | | País : | sd | | Sanciones : | Actions Taken Pursuant to Section 7031(c) for Involvement in a Gross Violation of Human Rights - (1)(B) Public Designation. Awatif Ahmed Seed Ahmed Mohamed is the spouse of Saleh Salah Abdalla Mohamed Mohamed Salih. | | Fuente : | US Anti-Kleptocracy and Human Rights Visa Restrictions | | Fecha : | 2026-06-02T13:46:44 |
Awad ALI SAEED
| Nombre : | Awad ALI SAEED | | Alias : | Awad Al-Karim ALI SAEED | | País : | sd | | Sanciones : | The Sudan (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2020 - The Secretary of State has reasonable grounds to suspect that Awad Al-Karim Ali Saeed is an involved person under the Sudan (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2020 because he is or has been involved in a relevant activity, namely being responsible for and providing support for the commission of violations of international humanitarian law in Sudan through his role as a Major General of the Sudanese Armed Forces and commander of the 1st Infantry Division in Gezira during the systematic campaign of violence against civilians in Gezira State including against persons on the basis of their ethnicity or religious beliefs. - 2026-10-26; description_identifier: disqualification under sanctions regulation - section: 3A - act: sanctions anti money laundering act 2018 - 2026-10-26 | | Fuente : | UK Companies House Disqualified Directors; UK FCDO Sanctions List | | Fecha : | 2026-10-28T00:33:04 |
Mirghani Idris Suleiman
| Nombre : | Mirghani Idris Suleiman | | Alias : | Al-Mirghani IDRIS; Al-Mirghani Idris; El Mirghani Idris SULEIMAN; El Mirghani Idris Suleiman; Margani Idries Suliman; Margani Idries Suliman IDRIES; Margani Idries Suliman Idries; Mirghani Idris Suleiman Idris; Mirghani Idriss SULEIMAN; Mirghani Idriss Suleiman; SULEIMAN, Mirghani Idris; Suleiman Mirghani Idriss; ميرغني ادريس سليمان ادريس | | Fecha de nacimiento : | 1959-12-28 | | País : | sd | | Dirección : | BAHRI; H 22 B 7, Northern Elsafia, Bahri | | Sanciones : | "(UE) 2024/1783 du 24/06/2024 (UE Soudan - Activités compromettant la stabilité et la transition politique - R (UE) 2023/2147) - Personnes associées: Général Abdelfattah Al-Burhan, commandant en chef des FAS - Entités associées: Defense Industry System, SMT Engineering; FAS - Le lieutenant-général Mirghani Idriss Suleiman est un officier des FAS et le directeur général de Defense Industry System (DIS), une société faisant l'objet de sanctions de l'Union européenne en raison du soutien qu'elle apporte à des actions et des politiques qui menacent la paix, la stabilité et la sécurité du Soudan. DIS est décrite comme étant la plus grande entreprise du Soudan dans le domaine de la défense, générant des recettes estimées à 2 milliards de dollars par l'intermédiaire de centaines de filiales dans différents secteurs de l'économie soudanaise. DIS fabrique un éventail d'armes de petit calibre, d'armes conventionnelles, de munitions et de véhicules militaires pour les FAS. En tant que directeur général de DIS, Mirghani Idriss Suleiman a énormément voyagé avec le général Abdelfattah Al-Burhan, commandant en chef des FAS, depuis le début de la guerre, prétendument afin de renforcer les capacités des FAS à lutter contre les FSR sur plusieurs fronts à Khartoum, au Darfour et au Kordofan. Par conséquent, Mirghani Idriss Suleiman apporte un soutien à des actions ou politiques qui menacent la paix, la stabilité ou la sécurité du Soudan."; 2024/1783 (OJ L24062024); Council Decision concerning restrictive measures in view of activities undermining the stability and political transition of Sudan; "Le lieutenant-général Mirghani Idriss Suleiman est un officier des forces armées soudanaises (FAS) et le directeur général de Defense Industry System (DIS), une société faisant l’objet de mesures restrictives de l’Union européenne en raison du soutien qu’elle apporte à des actions et des politiques qui menacent la paix, la stabilité et la sécurité du Soudan. En 2026, il a été nommé assistant aux affaires des industries militaires au sein des FAS. DIS est décrite comme étant la plus grande entreprise du Soudan dans le domaine de la défense, générant des recettes estimées à 2.000.000.000 de dollars par l’intermédiaire de centaines de filiales dans différents secteurs de l’économie soudanaise. DIS fabrique un éventail d’armes de petit calibre, d’armes conventionnelles, de munitions et de véhicules militaires pour les FAS. En tant que directeur général de DIS, Mirghani Idriss Suleiman a énormément voyagé avec le général Abdelfattah Al-Burhan, commandant en chef des FAS, depuis le début de la guerre, prétendument afin de renforcer les capacités des FAS à lutter contre les forces de soutien rapide (FSR) sur plusieurs fronts à Khartoum, au Darfour et au Kordofan. Par conséquent, Mirghani Idriss Suleiman apporte un soutien à des actions ou politiques qui menacent la paix, la stabilité ou la sécurité du Soudan."; Lieutenant General Mirghani Idriss Suleiman is an officer of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and Director-General of Defense Industry System (DIS), a company subject to restrictive measures by the European Union for providing support to actions and policies that threaten the peace, stability and security of Sudan. In 2026, he was appointed as Assistant for Military Industries Affairs within the SAF. DIS is described as Sudan’s largest defence enterprise, generating an estimated USD 2 000 000 000 in revenue through hundreds of subsidiaries across various sectors of Sudan’s economy. DIS manufactures a range of small arms, conventional weapons, ammunition and military vehicles for the SAF. As the Director-General of DIS, Mirghani Idriss Suleiman has travelled extensively with General Abdelfattah Al-Burhan, Commander-in-Chief of the SAF, since the beginning of the war, allegedly, to enhance the SAF’s capabilities to fight the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) on several fronts in Khartoum, Darfur and Kordofan. Therefore, Mirghani Idriss Suleiman provides support to actions or policies that threaten the peace, stability or security of Sudan. - 2024-06-24; Ordinance of 25 May 2005 on measures against Sudan (SR 946.231.18) - 2024-07-09; Reciprocal - Active - 2024-10-24; SDNZ - 2024/1783 (OJ L24062024) - 2024-06-24; SUDAN-EO14098 - Executive Order 14098 (Sudan); Sudan / Soudan - Part 1 - 2025-02-06 | | Fuente : | Belgian Financial Sanctions; Canadian Consolidated Autonomous Sanctions List; EU Consolidated Travel Bans; EU Council Official Journal Sanctioned Entities; EU Financial Sanctions Files (FSF); French National Asset Freezing System; Monaco National Fund Freezing List; Swiss SECO Sanctions/Embargoes; US OFAC Press Releases; US OFAC Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) List; US SAM Procurement Exclusions; US Trade Consolidated Screening List (CSL) | | Fecha : | 2026-11-11T12:59:44 |
Jaffar Ahmad Abdullah MAKKI
| Nombre : | Jaffar Ahmad Abdullah MAKKI | | Alias : | MAKKI, Jaffar Ahmad Abdullah | | Fecha de nacimiento : | 1956 | | País : | sd; us | | Sanciones : | Reciprocal - Active; SDGT - Unknown | | Fuente : | Romania Government Decision No. 1.272/2005: List of Suspected Terrorists; Taiwan Strategic High-Tech Commodities Entity List; US OFAC Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) List; US SAM Procurement Exclusions; US Trade Consolidated Screening List (CSL) | | Fecha : | 2026-03-30T15:36:11 |
AL-FAKHER ADVANCED WORKS CO. LTD
| Nombre : | AL-FAKHER ADVANCED WORKS CO. LTD | | Alias : | AL FAKHER COMPANY; AL-FAKHER ADVANCED WORKS CO. LTD.; Al Fakher Advanced Works Co Ltd; Al Fakher Company; Al-Fakher Advanced Business Company Limited; Al-Fakher Advanced Works Co. Ltd.; Al-Fakher Company; Al-Fakher Company for Advanced Business; Al-Fakher International Limited; شركة الفاخر لألعمال المتقدمة المحدودة; شركة الفاخر للأعمال المتقدمة المحدودة | | País : | sd | | Dirección : | Sudan; Sudan (North) | | Sanciones : | Reciprocal - Active - 2024-01-31; SUDAN-EO14098 - Executive Order 14098 (Sudan); The Sudan (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2020 - Al-Fakher Advanced Works Co. Ltd is an involved person under the Sudan (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2020, through its involvement in action, policy or activity which threatens the peace, stability and security of Sudan because of its central role in funding one of the main parties to the conflict, the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), in particular by conducting RSF’s gold export business. RSF leaders have generated millions of dollars through gold exports, which they have used to purchase weapons, including crew-served weapons and rocket-propelled grenades. - 2024-04-15; description_identifier: disqualification under sanctions regulation - section: 3A - act: sanctions anti money laundering act 2018 - 2025-04-09 | | Fuente : | PermID Open Data; UK Companies House Disqualified Directors; UK FCDO Sanctions List; US OFAC Press Releases; US OFAC Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) List; US SAM Procurement Exclusions; US Trade Consolidated Screening List (CSL) | | Fecha : | 2026-07-16T07:17:05 |
Musa Hatari
| Nombre : | Musa Hatari | | Alias : | Atari Musa; HATARI, Musa; Musa Tahir; Musa Tark; Musah Atari; Musah Tarah; Musah Tarak; Mussa Atar | | Fecha de nacimiento : | 1964; 1965; 1966 | | País : | sd | | Dirección : | Songo | | Sanciones : | CAR - Executive Order 13667 (CAR) | | Fuente : | US OFAC Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) List; US Trade Consolidated Screening List (CSL) | | Fecha : | 2026-01-06T08:10:01 |
Asyaf International Holding Group for Trading and Investment
| Nombre : | Asyaf International Holding Group for Trading and Investment | | Alias : | AL-'USAMAH COMPANY; ASAMA COMMERCIAL COMPANY; Al-'Usama Trading Company; Al-'Usamah Company; Al-Osama Trading Co. Ltd.; Asama Commercial Company; Asama Company; Asyaf Group; Asyaf International Holding Group; Asyaf International Holding Group for Trading & Investment; Dan Isdico; M/S Osama Khairy Hafez Trading Est.; Nurin Company; Osama Trading Company Ltd | | País : | sa; sd | | Dirección : | 504 & 7102, Ibrahim Shakir Building, Hail Street Rowais, Near Caravan Center Jeddah 21492 Saudi Arabia; 504 & 7102, Ibrahim Shakir Building, Hail Street Rowais, Near Caravan Center, Jeddah 21492; Al Kharaj; Al Kharaj Saudi Arabia; Dammam; Dammam Saudi Arabia; Khartoum; Khartoum Sudan; P.O. BOX 8800, JEDDAH 21492; P.O. Box 8800 Jeddah 21492 Saudi Arabia; P.O. Box 8800, Jeddah 21492; Pr. Amir Sultan Street, Khalidiya Business Center, 3rd Floor, Khalidiya Jeddah Saudi Arabia; Pr. Amir Sultan Street, Khalidiya Business Center, 3rd Floor, Khalidiya, Jeddah; Qasim; Qasim Saudi Arabia; Riyadh 14213; Riyadh 14213 Saudi Arabia; Saudi Arabia | | Sanciones : | Reciprocal - Active - 2025-03-28; SDGT - Executive Order 13224 (Terrorism) | | Fuente : | PermID Open Data; Taiwan Strategic High-Tech Commodities Entity List; US OFAC Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) List; US SAM Procurement Exclusions; US Trade Consolidated Screening List (CSL) | | Fecha : | 2026-03-30T15:36:11 |
Abu Dharr Abdul Nabi Habiballa Ahmmed
| Nombre : | Abu Dharr Abdul Nabi Habiballa Ahmmed | | Alias : | AHMMED, Abu Dharr Abdul Nabi Habiballa; Abo Zer Abdelnabi Habiballa Ahmmed; Abozer Habib; Abu Dharr Abdul Nabi Habiballa AHMMED; أبو ذر عبد النبي حبيب الله أحمد | | Fecha de nacimiento : | 1990-01-01 | | País : | ae; sd | | Dirección : | Dubai, United Arab Emirates | | Sanciones : | Reciprocal - Active - 2025-01-07; SUDAN-EO14098 - Executive Order 14098 (Sudan); "The Sudan (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2020 - The Secretary of State considers that there are reasonable grounds to suspect that Abu Dharr Abdul Nabi Habiballa Ahmmed is an involved person under the Sudan (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2020 because he has, through his position in Capital Tap Holding LLC , provided support for action, policy or activity which threatens the peace, stability and security of Sudan, and has provided financial services and made available funds and economic resources that could contribute to such activity in that Capital Tap Holding LLC and its subsidiaries have played a significant role in the supply of money and weapons to the Rapid Support Forces, one of the main parties to the conflict in Sudan. - The Secretary of State considers that there are reasonable grounds to suspect that Abu Dharr Abdul Nabi Habiballa Ahmmed is an involved person under the Sudan (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2020 because he has, through his position in Capital Tap Holding LLC , provided support for action, policy or activity which threatens the peace, stability and security of Sudan, and has provided financial services and made available funds and economic resources that could contribute to such activity in that Capital Tap Holding LLC and its subsidiaries have played a significant role in the supply of money and weapons to the Rapid Support Forces, one of the main parties to the conflict in Sudan. - 2026-07-16" | | Teléfono : | '00971558941244; 00971558941244 | | Email : | Abozerhabib788@gmail.com | | Fuente : | UK FCDO Sanctions List; US OFAC Press Releases; US OFAC Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) List; US SAM Procurement Exclusions; US Trade Consolidated Screening List (CSL) | | Fecha : | 2026-07-16T12:40:02 |
Abdul Aziz ABBAKAR MUHAMAD
| Nombre : | Abdul Aziz ABBAKAR MUHAMAD | | Alias : | ABBAKAR MUHAMAD, Abdul Aziz | | Fecha de nacimiento : | 1961 | | País : | sd; us | | Sanciones : | Reciprocal - Active; SDGT - Unknown | | Fuente : | Romania Government Decision No. 1.272/2005: List of Suspected Terrorists; Taiwan Strategic High-Tech Commodities Entity List; US OFAC Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) List; US SAM Procurement Exclusions; US Trade Consolidated Screening List (CSL) | | Fecha : | 2026-03-30T15:36:11 |
Alcardinal Petroleum Company Limited
| Nombre : | Alcardinal Petroleum Company Limited | | Alias : | ALCARDINAL PETROLEUM CO. LTD; Alcardinal Petroleum Co Ltd; Alcardinal Petroleum Co. Ltd; Alcardinal Petroleum Company Ltd | | País : | ke; sd; ss | | Dirección : | Juba; Kenya; MOMBASA; Mombasa; Sudan (North) | | Sanciones : | GLOMAG - Executive Order 13818 (Global Magnitsky); Reciprocal - Active - 2019-10-11 | | Fuente : | PermID Open Data; US OFAC Press Releases; US OFAC Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) List; US SAM Procurement Exclusions; US Trade Consolidated Screening List (CSL) | | Fecha : | 2026-09-02T02:22:05 |
Gaffar Mohmed EL HASSAN
| Nombre : | Gaffar Mohmed EL HASSAN | | Alias : | EL HASSAN, Gaffar Mohmed; ELHASSAN, Gaffar Mohammed; Elhassan Gaffar Mohammed; GAFFAR MOHAMMED ELHASSAN; Gaffar Mohamed EL HASSAN; Gaffar Mohammed Elhassan; Gaffar Mohmed Elhassan; ガアファル・ムハンマド・エルハサン; ガアファル・モハメッド・エルハサン | | Fecha de nacimiento : | 1952-06-24 | | País : | na; sd; us | | Dirección : | El Waha Omdurman Sudan; El Waha, Omdurman; El Waha, Omdurman, SUDAN; El Waha, Omdurman, Sudan; スーダン共和国オムドゥルマン(Omdurman)・エルワハ(El Waha) | | Sanciones : | (UE) 2017/401 du 07/03/2017 (ONU Soudan - RCSNU 1591 (2005) et R (UE) 747/2014) - (UE) 75/2014 du 27/01/2014 (ONU Soudan - RCSNU 1591 (2005) et R (UE) 747/2014) - décision du comité des sanctions des Nations unies du 25/04/2006 (ONU Soudan - RCSNU 1591 (2005) et R (UE) 747/2014) - CE 760/2006 du 18/05/2006 (ONU Soudan - RCSNU 1591 (2005) et R (UE) 747/2014) - A violé les dispositions du paragraphe 7 de la résolution 1591 (2005) du Conseil de sécurité en demandant (à Khartoum) et en autorisant (à compter du 29/03/2005), dans l'exercice de ses fonctions, le transfert de matériel militaire au Darfour sans l'approbation préalable du Comité créé par la résolution 1591; 1591 (Sudan) - 2025-12-16; 2006-04-25; 2017/401 (OJ L63); A violé les dispositions du paragraphe 7 de la résolution 1591 (2005) du Conseil de sécurité en demandant (à Khartoum) et en autorisant (à compter du 29/03/2005), dans l'exercice de ses fonctions, le transfert de matériel militaire au Darfour sans l'approbation préalable du Comité créé par la résolution 1591; Council Decision concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Sudan and repealing Decision 2011/423/CFSP; DARFUR - Unknown; Ordinance of 25 May 2005 on measures against Sudan (SR 946.231.18) - 2012-11-27; Reciprocal - Active; SDN - 2017/401 (OJ L63) - 2006-04-25; Sudan - 2006-04-25; The Panel of Experts report that Major-General Gaffar Mohammed Elhassan stated to them that he had direct operational command (primarily tactical command) of all elements of the SAF in Darfur while he was in command of the Western Military Region. Elhassan held this position as Western Military Area Commander from November 2004 (approx.)-early 2006. The Panel's information is that Elhassan was responsible for violations of paragraph 7 of SCR 1591 as by virtue of this position he requested (from Khartoum) and authorised (since 29 March 2005) the transfer of military equipment into Darfur without the prior approval of the 1591 Committee. Elhassan himself admitted to the Panel of Experts that aircraft, aircraft engines and other military equipment had been brought into Darfur from other parts of Sudan between 29 March 2005 and December 2005. For example he informed the Panel that 2 Mi-24 attack helicopters were brought unauthorised into Darfur between 18 and 21 September 2005. There are also reasonable grounds to believe that Elhassan was directly responsible, as Western Military Area Commander, for authorising offensive military flights in the area around Abu Hamra, 23-24 July 2005 and in the Jebel Moon area of Western Darfur, on 19 November 2005. Mi-24 attack helicopters were involved in both operations and reportedly opened fire on both occasions. The Panel of Experts report that Elhassan indicated to the Panel that he himself approved requests for air support and other air operations in his capacity as Western Military Area Commander. (See Panel of Experts report, S/2006/65, paragraphs 266-269.) Through such actions Major-General Gaffar Mohammed Elhassan has breached relevant provisions of SCR 1591 and therefore meets the criteria to be designated by the Committee to be subjected to sanctions. - 2006-04-25; The Sudan (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2020 - 2006-04-25; UN List - Sudan - 2006-04-25; Резолюція РБ ООН 1591 (2005) - 2013-03-21; スーダンにおけるダルフール和平阻害関与者等 - 専門家パネルの報告において、ガアファル・ムハンマド・エルハサン少将は専門家パネルに対して、西部地域司令官在任中、ダルフールにおけるすべての部隊への直接的な作戦指揮権(主に戦術指揮)を有していたと述べた。同人は、2004年11月頃から2006年初めまで西部地域司令官の職にあった。パネルの情報によると、同人は、この職により、委員会の事前承認なくダルフールへの軍用装備の移動を(ハルツームから)要求し(2005年3月29日以降、)許可し、国連安保理決議1591のパラ7違反の責任を有した。同人自身、専門家パネルに対し2005年3月29日から2005年12月までの間、スーダンの他の地域からダルフールへ航空機、航空機エンジン、その他の軍用装備を持ち込んだ旨認めた。例えば、同人は、専門家パネルに対し2005年9月18日から21日の間、Mi-24攻撃ヘリコプター2機をダルフールに許可なく持ち込んだ旨伝えた。同人が西部地域司令官として、2005年7月23日、24日のアブ・ハムラ周辺地域及び2005年11月19日の西ダルフール・ジャバル・ムーン地域への航空攻撃を許可したことについて、直接的な責任を有すると信じるに至る合理的な根拠もある。両作戦には、Mi-24攻撃ヘリコプターが関与しており、伝えられるところでは両作戦において射撃を行った。専門家パネルの報告では、同人自身が専門家パネルに対し西部地域司令官として、航空支援及び他の航空作戦の要請を承認した旨示唆した。(専門家パネル報告S/2006/65パラ266-269参照。)同人は、このような行為を通じて、国連安保理決議第1591号の関連規定に違反しており、したがって委員会により指定される制裁の対象とされるべき基準を満たしている。 - 2006-06-30 - 2015-06-19 - 2018-08-17 - 2007-12-21 | | Fuente : | Argentina RePET Sanctions; Australian Sanctions Consolidated List; Belgian Financial Sanctions; EU Consolidated Travel Bans; EU Council Official Journal Sanctioned Entities; EU Financial Sanctions Files (FSF); French National Asset Freezing System; Hong Kong Targeted Financial Sanctions (Cap. 537); Japan Economic Sanctions and List of Eligible People; Monaco National Fund Freezing List; South Africa Targeted Financial Sanctions; Swiss SECO Sanctions/Embargoes; Taiwan Strategic High-Tech Commodities Entity List; UK FCDO Sanctions List; UN Security Council Consolidated Sanctions; US OFAC Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) List; US SAM Procurement Exclusions; US Trade Consolidated Screening List (CSL); Ukraine SFMS Blacklist | | Fecha : | 2026-11-03T17:55:05 |
Al Haram Foreign Exchange Co. LTD
| Nombre : | Al Haram Foreign Exchange Co. LTD | | Alias : | , Al Haram Transfer Co.; AL HARAM EXCHANGE; ALHARAM EXCHANGE; ALHARM GIDA TEKS. OTO. SAN. TİC.LTD. ŞTİ.; Al Haram Commercial Company; Al Haram Exchange Company; Al Haram Foreign Exchange Co. Ltd.; Al Haram Transfer Co.; Al-Haram Company for Money Transfer; Al-Haram Exchange Company; Al-Harm Trading Company; Alharam for Exchange Ltd; Arabisc Haram; Haram Trading Company; "Sharikat Al Haram Lil-Hiwalat Al Maliyyah; Al Haram Foreign Exchange Co. Ltd"; Sharikat al-Haram lil-Hiwalat al-Maliyyah; Trading Al-Harm Company; ارابيك الهرم; الهرم للصرافة; شركة الهرم الصرافة; شركة الهرم للتحويلات المالية; شركة الهرم للحوالات المالية - شركة الهرم للصرافة الأجنبية | | País : | jo; lb; ps; sd; tr | | Dirección : | Alanya; Alanya Turkey; Ankara; Ankara Turkey; Antakya; Antakya Turkey; Antalya; Antalya Turkey; Belen; Belen Turkey; Bursa; Bursa Turkey; Cumhuriyet Mah. Ata Sokak. Hacı Ahmet Kaşıkçı No:21/10 Kırıkhan/ hatay; Gaziantep; Gaziantep Turkey; Iskenderun; Iskenderun Turkey; Islahiye; Islahiye Turkey; Istanbul; Istanbul Turkey; Izmir; Izmir Turkey; Jordan; Kayseri; Kayseri Turkey; Kirikhan; Kirikhan Turkey; Konya; Konya Turkey; Lebanon; Mersin; Mersin Turkey; Narlica; Narlica Turkey; Palestine; Palestinian; Reyhanli; Reyhanli Turkey; Sudan; Surmez; Surmez Turkey; Turkey; Urfa; Urfa Turkey | | Sanciones : | 2020-07-15; Asset freezes pursuant to Article 6 of Law No. 6415, targeting individuals and entities based on requests made by foreign governments.; SDGT - Executive Order 13224 (Terrorism); مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (51) لسنة 2020 | | Fuente : | Qatar Unified Record of Persons and Entities on Sanction List; Saudi Arabia National Terrorism List (UNSCR 1373); Taiwan Strategic High-Tech Commodities Entity List; Türkiye Asset Freezing Sanctions List (MASAK); US OFAC Press Releases; US OFAC Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) List; US Trade Consolidated Screening List (CSL); United Arab Emirates Local Terrorist List | | Fecha : | 2026-07-20T15:28:44 |
Abbas BAKHIT
| Nombre : | Abbas BAKHIT | | Alias : | Abbas Khater BAKHIT | | País : | sd | | Sanciones : | "The Sudan (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2020 - The Secretary of State has reasonable grounds to suspect that Abbas Khater Bakhit ('BAKHIT') is an involved person under the Sudan (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2020 based on the following grounds: BAKHIT is or has been involved in a relevant activity, namely he has been responsible for or engaged in serious human rights violations or abuses as Lieutenant Colonel of the Rapid Support Forces and Commander overseeing the Al-Mina Al-Bari Detention Centre. In particular, he directed or participated in the torture of detainees during the 'take over' of El Fasher in October 2025. BAKHIT is associated with an involved person, Gedo Hamdan Ahmed ('Ahmed'). Ahmed is Lieutenant General and Deputy Commander of the Rapid Support Forces who has engaged in actions or policies that threaten the peace, security, or stability of Darfur, including acts of violence and human rights abuses. Ahmed was BAKHIT’s superior at the Al-Mina Al-Bari Detention Centre. - The Secretary of State has reasonable grounds to suspect that Abbas Khater Bakhit (“BAKHIT”) is an involved person under the Sudan (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2020 based on the following grounds: BAKHIT is or has been involved in a relevant activity, namely he has been responsible for or engaged in serious human rights violations or abuses as Lieutenant Colonel of the Rapid Support Forces and Commander overseeing the Al-Mina Al-Bari Detention Centre. In particular, he directed or participated in the torture of detainees during the “take over” of El Fasher in October 2025. BAKHIT is associated with an involved person, Gedo Hamdan Ahmed (“Ahmed”). Ahmed is Lieutenant General and Deputy Commander of the Rapid Support Forces who has engaged in actions or policies that threaten the peace, security, or stability of Darfur, including acts of violence and human rights abuses. Ahmed was BAKHIT’s superior at the Al-Mina Al-Bari Detention Centre. - 2026-10-26"; description_identifier: disqualification under sanctions regulation - section: 3A - act: sanctions anti money laundering act 2018 - 2026-10-26 | | Fuente : | UK Companies House Disqualified Directors; UK FCDO Sanctions List | | Fecha : | 2026-10-28T12:33:04 |
Andrei Sergeevich Mandel
| Nombre : | Andrei Sergeevich Mandel | | Alias : | Andrei Sergeyevich MANDEL; Andrej Sergejevitj MANDEL; Andrej Sergejevič MANDEĽ; Andrej Sergejevič Manděl; Andrey Sergeevich Mandel; MANDEL, Andrei Sergeevich; Mandel Andrei; Mandel Andrii Serhiiovych; Андрей Сергеевич МАНДЕЛЬ; Андрей Сергеевич Мандель; Мандель Андрей Сергеевич; Мандель Андрій Сергійович | | Fecha de nacimiento : | 1990-03-02 | | País : | de; ru; sd | | Dirección : | ST. PETERSBURG; St. Petersburg | | Sanciones : | ; (UE) 2025/2471 du 04/12/2025 (UE Violation des droits de l'homme - R (UE) 2020/1998) - (UE) 2024/2999 du 02/12/2024 (UE Violation des droits de l'homme - R (UE) 2020/1998) - (UE) 2023/430 du 25/02/2023 (UE Violation des droits de l'homme - R (UE) 2020/1998) - Andrei Mandel dirige M-Invest, une entité servant de couverture aux opérations du groupe Wagner au Soudan, et est impliqué dans sa filiale Meroe Gold. Il a un rôle dirigeant au sein du groupe Wagner au Soudan et entretenait des liens étroits avec Yevgeny Prigozhin. Par son étroite affiliation à l’armée soudanaise, le groupe Wagner s’est assuré d’exploiter l’or soudanais et de l’exporter vers la Russie. Mandel est associé au groupe Wagner, inscrit sur la liste pour de graves atteintes aux droits de l’homme, dont des actes de torture et des exécutions et assassinats extrajudiciaires, sommaires ou arbitraires, dans plusieurs pays, dont le Soudan. Par ses activités, il soutient également de telles atteintes commises au Soudan. De récents rapports indiquent que Mandel a également travaillé pour Wagner au Mali.; 116/2023 - active - 2023-02-26 - 2033-02-26; 2023/430 (OJ L59I) - 2024/2999 (OJ L03122024); Andrei Mandel dirige M-Invest, une entité servant de couverture aux opérations du groupe Wagner au Soudan, et est impliqué dans sa filiale Meroe Gold. Il a un rôle dirigeant au sein du groupe Wagner au Soudan et entretenait des liens étroits avec Yevgeny Prigozhin. Par son étroite affiliation à l’armée soudanaise, le groupe Wagner s’est assuré d’exploiter l’or soudanais et de l’exporter vers la Russie. Mandel est associé au groupe Wagner, inscrit sur la liste pour de graves atteintes aux droits de l’homme, dont des actes de torture et des exécutions et assassinats extrajudiciaires, sommaires ou arbitraires, dans plusieurs pays, dont le Soudan. Par ses activités, il soutient également de telles atteintes commises au Soudan. De récents rapports indiquent que Mandel a également travaillé pour Wagner au Mali.; Andrei Mandel is head of M-Invest, a cover entity for the Wagner Group’s operations in Sudan, as well as being involved in its subsidiary Meroe Gold. He has a leading role within the Wagner Group in Sudan and had close links to Yevgeny Prigozhin. By being closely affiliated with the Sudanese military, the Wagner Group secured the exploiting and exporting of Sudanese gold to Russia. Mandel is associated with the Wagner Group, listed for serious human rights abuses, which include torture and extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions and killings, in several countries, including Sudan. Through his activities, he also provides support for such abuses committed in Sudan. Recent reports state that Mandel also worked for Wagner in Mali. - 2023-02-25; CYBER2 - Executive Order 13661 (Ukraine) - Executive Order 13694 (Cyber) - Executive Order 13848 (Election); Council Decision concerning restrictive measures against serious human rights violations and abuses; HR - 2024/2999 (OJ L03122024) - 2023-02-25; Reciprocal - Active - 2020-07-15; Russia / Russie - 1, Part 1 - 2023-07-19; The Sudan (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2020 - Andrei Sergeevich Mandel is an involved person under The Sudan (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2020 through his association with M-Invest, which acts as a front for the Wagner Group, and which is itself an involved person as it is responsible for action, policy or activity which threatens the peace, stability and security of Sudan. - 2023-07-20 | | Fuente : | Belgian Financial Sanctions; Canadian Consolidated Autonomous Sanctions List; EU Consolidated Travel Bans; EU Council Official Journal Sanctioned Entities; EU Financial Sanctions Files (FSF); French National Asset Freezing System; Monaco National Fund Freezing List; Russian Unified State Register of Legal Entities; UK FCDO Sanctions List; US OFAC Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) List; US SAM Procurement Exclusions; US Trade Consolidated Screening List (CSL); Ukraine NSDC State Register of Sanctions; Ukraine War and Sanctions | | Fecha : | 2026-09-15T09:48:57 |
MAK INTERNATIONAL SERVICE CO LTD
| Nombre : | MAK INTERNATIONAL SERVICE CO LTD | | Alias : | MAK INTERNATIONAL; MAK INTERNATIONAL SERVICES CO LTD; Mak International Services Co Ltd | | País : | sd; ss | | Dirección : | JUBA; Juba; Sudan (North) | | Sanciones : | Reciprocal - Active - 2017-09-06; SOUTH SUDAN - Executive Order 13664 (South Sudan) | | Fuente : | PermID Open Data; US OFAC Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) List; US SAM Procurement Exclusions; US Trade Consolidated Screening List (CSL) | | Fecha : | 2026-09-02T02:22:05 |
Target Multiactivities Company Ltd
| Nombre : | Target Multiactivities Company Ltd | | Alias : | TMAC; Target Multiactivities Company Ltd.; تارقيت للانشطة المتعددة المحدودة | | País : | sd | | Dirección : | Khartoum | | Sanciones : | SUDAN-EO14098 - Executive Order 14098 (Sudan) | | Fuente : | US OFAC Press Releases; US OFAC Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) List; US Trade Consolidated Screening List (CSL) | | Fecha : | 2026-07-16T07:17:05 |
Gebreil Ibrahim Mohamed Fediel
| Nombre : | Gebreil Ibrahim Mohamed Fediel | | Alias : | FEDIEL, Gebreil Ibrahim Mohamed; Gibril Ibrahim MOHAMED; Gibril Ibrahim Mohamed; Jibril IBRAHIM; Jibril Ibrahim | | Fecha de nacimiento : | 1955-05-10 | | País : | sd | | Dirección : | PORT SUDAN; Port Sudan | | Sanciones : | Reciprocal - Active - 2025-09-12; SUDAN-EO14098 - Executive Order 14098 (Sudan) | | Fuente : | US OFAC Press Releases; US OFAC Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) List; US SAM Procurement Exclusions; US Trade Consolidated Screening List (CSL) | | Fecha : | 2026-07-16T07:17:05 |
AZZA AIR TRANSPORT COMPANY LTD.
| Nombre : | AZZA AIR TRANSPORT COMPANY LTD. | | Alias : | AZZA AVIATION COMPANY; AZZA TRANSPORT; Azza Air Transport Co Ltd | | País : | ir; sd; us | | Dirección : | German Culture Center, McNimer Street, Khartoum; German Culture Center, McNimer Street, P. O. Box 11586, KHARTOUM, KHARTOUM, Sudan (North); German Culture Center, McNimer Street, P. O. Box 11586, Khartoum; Iran | | Sanciones : | DARFUR - Unknown; Reciprocal - Active | | Fuente : | PermID Open Data; US OFAC Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) List; US SAM Procurement Exclusions; US Trade Consolidated Screening List (CSL) | | Fecha : | 2026-09-02T02:22:05 |
Sa'ad BIN LADEN
| Nombre : | Sa'ad BIN LADEN | | Alias : | ABBUD, Bin Muhammad Awad; ABUD, Sa'ad Muhammad Awad; ADBUD, Muhammad 'Awad; AL-KAHTANE, Abdul Rahman; AWAD, Muhammad; Abdul Rahman AL-KAHTANE; BAABOOD, Sa'ad Muhammad; BIN LADEN, Sa'ad; BIN LADEN, Sad; Bin Muhammad Awad ABBUD; Muhammad 'Awad ADBUD; Muhammad AWAD; Sa'ad Muhammad Awad ABUD; Sa'ad Muhammad BAABOOD; Sad BIN LADEN | | Fecha de nacimiento : | 1982 | | País : | sa; sd; us | | Sanciones : | Reciprocal - Active; SDGT - Unknown | | Fuente : | Taiwan Strategic High-Tech Commodities Entity List; US OFAC Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) List; US SAM Procurement Exclusions; US Trade Consolidated Screening List (CSL) | | Fecha : | 2026-07-11T07:55:01 |
Awad Ibn AUF
| Nombre : | Awad Ibn AUF | | Alias : | AUF, Awad Ibn; Awad Ahmad Ibn AWF; Awad Ibn AWF; Awad Mohamed Ahmed Ibn OAF; Awad Mohamed Ahmed Ibn OUF; Awad Mohammed Ahmed Ebni NAUF; Awad Muhammad Ibn AUF; Mohammed Ahmed Awad Ibn AUF | | Fecha de nacimiento : | 1954 | | País : | sd; us | | Sanciones : | DARFUR - Unknown; Reciprocal - Active | | Fuente : | US OFAC Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) List; US SAM Procurement Exclusions; US Trade Consolidated Screening List (CSL) | | Fecha : | 2026-07-11T07:55:01 |
Lord's Resistance Army
| Nombre : | Lord's Resistance Army | | Alias : | Armée de Résistance du Seigneur; LORD'S RESISTANCE ARMY; LORDS RESISTANCE ARMY; LRA; LRM; LRM/A; Lord's Resistance Movement; Lord's Resistance Movement (LRM); Lord's Resistance Movement/ Army; Lord's Resistance Movement/Army; Lord's Resistance Movement/Army (LRM/A); Lords Resistance Army; Lords Resistance Movement; Lord’s Resistance Army; Lord’s Resistance Movement; Lord’s Resistance Movement (LRM); Lord’s Resistance Movement/Army; Lord’s Resistance Movement/Army (LRM/A); The Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA); 神の抵抗軍; 神の抵抗運動; 神の抵抗運動/軍 | | País : | cd; cf; km; sd | | Dirección : | (Reported address: Kafia Kingi (a territory on the border of Sudan and South Sudan whose final status has yet to be determined). As of January 2015, 500 Lord's Resistance Army elements were reportedly expelled from the Sudan.); (Reported address: Kafia Kingi (a territory on the border of Sudan and South Sudan whose final status has yet to be determined). As of January 2015, 500 Lord’s Resistance Army elements were reportedly expelled from the Sudan.); Bas-Uolo; Bas-Uolo Democratic Republic of the Congo; Bas-Uolo, CONGO, Democratic Republic of (was Zaire); Bas-Uolo, Congo (Democratic Republic); Bas-Uolo, Congo DR; Bas-Uolo, Democratic Republic of the Congo; Basse-Kotto; Basse-Kotto Central African Republic; Basse-Kotto, CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC; Basse-Kotto, Central African Republic; Central African Republic; Comoros; Haut-Mbomou; Haut-Mbomou Central African Republic; Haut-Mbomou, CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC; Haut-Mbomou, Central African Republic; Haut-Uolo; Haut-Uolo Democratic Republic of the Congo; Haut-Uolo, CONGO, Democratic Republic of (was Zaire); Haut-Uolo, Congo (Democratic Republic); Haut-Uolo, Congo DR; Haut-Uolo, Democratic Republic of the Congo; HautUolo, CONGO, Democratic Republic of (was Zaire); HautUolo, Democratic Republic of the Congo; Haute-Kotto; Haute-Kotto Central African Republic; Haute-Kotto, CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC; Haute-Kotto, Central African Republic; Kafia Kingi; Kafia Kingi (territoire situé à la frontière entre le Soudan et le Soudan du Sud dont le statut final reste à déterminer).; Mbomou; Mbomou Central African Republic; Mbomou, CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC; Mbomou, Central African Republic; Reported address: Kafia Kingi (a territory on the border of Sudan and South Sudan whose final status has yet to be determined).; Reported address: Kafia Kingi (a territory on the border of Sudan and South Sudan whose final status has yet to be determined). As of January 2015, 500 Lord’s Resistance Army elements were reportedly expelled from the Sudan; Sudan (North); VAKAGA; Vakaga; Vakaga Central African Republic; Vakaga, CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC; Vakaga, Central African Republic; コンゴ民主共和国オー・ウエレ州(Haut-Uolo)、; コンゴ民主共和国バ・ズエレ州(Bas-Uolo)、; 中央アフリカ共和国オート・コット県(Haute-Kotto)、; 中央アフリカ共和国オー・ムボムー県(Haut-Mbomou)、; 中央アフリカ共和国バス・コット県(Basse-Kotto)、; 中央アフリカ共和国ムボムー県(Mbomou)、; 中央アフリカ共和国ヴァカガ県(Vakaga)、; 報告されている住所:カフィア・キンジ地域(Kafia Kingi)(最終的な地位が確定していないスーダン共和国と南スーダン共和国の国境地帯にある領域)。2015年1月時点で、神の抵抗軍500名がスーダン共和国から追放されたとの報告がある。 | | Sanciones : | (UE) 2016/354 du 11/03/2016 (ONU République centrafricaine - RCSNU 2127 (2013) et R (UE) 224/2014) - (UE) 2017/906 du 29/05/2017 (ONU République centrafricaine - RCSNU 2127 (2013) et R (UE) 224/2014) - Décision du comité des sanctions des Nations Unies du 07/03/2016 (ONU République centrafricaine - RCSNU 2127 (2013) et R (UE) 224/2014) - A émergé dans le nord de l'Ouganda dans les années 80. A enlevé, tué et mutilé des milliers de civils en Afrique centrale, dont des centaines en République centrafricaine. Son chef est Joseph Kony - Inscrite pour s'être livrée ou avoir apporté un appui à des actes qui compromettent la paix, la stabilité ou la sécurité en République centrafricaine - Pour y avoir préparé, donné l'ordre de commettre ou commis des actes contraires au droit international des droits de l'homme ou au droit international humanitaire ou constituant des atteintes aux droits de l'homme ou des violations de ces droits, notamment des violences sexuelles, attaques dirigées contre des civils, attentats à motivation ethnique ou religieuse, attentats commis contre des écoles et des hôpitaux, enlèvements, déplacements forcés , pour avoir recruté ou utilisé des enfants dans le conflit armé du pays, en violation du droit international et pour avoir apporté un appui à des groupes armés ou à des réseaux criminels par l'exploitation illégale ou le trafic de ressources naturelles de la République centrafricaine telles que les diamants, l'or, les espèces sauvages ou les produits qui en sont tirés.; 2016-03-07; 2016/354 (OJ L67); 2127 (Central African Republic) - 2016-03-08; A émergé dans le nord de l'Ouganda dans les années 80. A enlevé, tué et mutilé des milliers de civils en Afrique centrale, dont des centaines en République centrafricaine. Son chef est Joseph Kony - Inscrite pour s'être livrée ou avoir apporté un appui à des actes qui compromettent la paix, la stabilité ou la sécurité en République centrafricaine - Pour y avoir préparé, donné l'ordre de commettre ou commis des actes contraires au droit international des droits de l'homme ou au droit international humanitaire ou constituant des atteintes aux droits de l'homme ou des violations de ces droits, notamment des violences sexuelles, attaques dirigées contre des civils, attentats à motivation ethnique ou religieuse, attentats commis contre des écoles et des hôpitaux, enlèvements, déplacements forcés , pour avoir recruté ou utilisé des enfants dans le conflit armé du pays, en violation du droit international et pour avoir apporté un appui à des groupes armés ou à des réseaux criminels par l'exploitation illégale ou le trafic de ressources naturelles de la République centrafricaine telles que les diamants, l'or, les espèces sauvages ou les produits qui en sont tirés.; CAF - 2017/906 (OJ L139) - 2016-03-07; CAR - 2016-03-07; CAR - Executive Order 13667 (CAR); Ordinance of 14 March 2014 on measures against the Central African Republic (RS 946.231.123.6), annex - 2016-03-07; Reciprocal - Active - 2016-03-08; The Central African Republic (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2020 - Emerged in northern Uganda in the 1980s. Has engaged in the abduction, killing and mutilation of thousands of civilians in Central Africa, including hundreds in the Central African Republic. The leader is Joseph Kony (CFi.009). INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/une/5932344 - 2016-03-07; "The Lord's Resistance Army was listed on 7 March 2016 pursuant to paragraphs 12 and 13 (b), (c), and (d) of Resolution 2262 (2016) as ‘engaging in or providing support for acts that undermine the peace, stability or security of the CAR; ’, ‘involved in planning, directing, or committing acts that violate international human rights law or international humanitarian law, as applicable, or that constitute human rights abuses or violations, in the CAR, including acts involving sexual violence, targeting of civilians, ethnic- or religious-based attacks, attacks on schools and hospitals, and abduction and forced displacement; ’, ‘recruiting or using children in armed conflict in the CAR, in violation of applicable international law; ’ and ‘providing support for armed groups or criminal networks through the illicit exploitation or trade of natural resources, including diamonds, gold, and wildlife products in or from the CAR’. Emerging in northern Uganda in the 1980s, the LRA has engaged in the abduction, killing, and mutilation of thousands of civilians across central Africa. Under increasing military pressure, Joseph Kony, the LRA's leader, ordered the LRA to withdraw from Uganda in 2005 and 2006. Since then, the LRA has been operating in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), CAR, South Sudan and reportedly Sudan. Since December 2013, the LRA has kidnapped, displaced, committed sexual violence against, and killed hundreds of individuals across CAR, and has looted and destroyed civilian property. Concentrated in eastern CAR and reportedly in Kafia Kingi, a territory on the border of Sudan and South Sudan whose final status has yet to be determined but militarily controlled by the former, the LRA raids villages to pillage food and supplies. The fighters set ambushes to attack security forces and steal their equipment when they respond to LRA attacks, and LRA fighters also target and loot villages that do not have a military presence. The LRA has also intensified attacks on diamond and gold mining sites. LRA cells are frequently accompanied by captives who are forced to work as porters, cooks, and sex slaves. The LRA engages in gender-based violence including rapes of women and young girls. In December 2013, the LRA abducted dozens of people in Haute-Kotto. The LRA is reported to have been involved in the abductions of hundreds of civilians in CAR since the beginning of 2014. LRA fighters attacked Obo, in eastern CAR's Haut-Mbomou Prefecture, on several occasions in early 2014. The LRA continued to carry out attacks in Obo and other locations in southeastern CAR between May and July 2014, including apparently coordinated attacks and abductions in Mbomou Prefecture in early June. Since at least 2014, the LRA has been involved in elephant poaching and elephant trafficking for revenue generation. The LRA reportedly traffics ivory from Garamba National Park in northern DRC to Darfur, to trade for weapons and supplies. The LRA reportedly transports poached elephant tusks through CAR into Darfur, Sudan to sell. Additionally, as of early 2014, Kony had reportedly ordered LRA fighters to loot diamonds and gold from miners in eastern CAR for transport to Sudan. As of January 2015, 500 Lord's Resistance Army elements were reportedly expelled from the Sudan. In early February 2015, LRA fighters armed with heavy weapons abducted civilians in Kpangbayanga, Haut-Mbomou, and stole food items. On April 20, 2015, an LRA attack and the abduction of children from Ndambissoua, southeastern CAR led most of the village residents to flee. And in early July 2015, the LRA attacked several villages in southern Haute-Kotto Prefecture; the attacks involved looting, violence against civilians, burning of houses, and kidnapping. Since January 2016, attacks imputed to the LRA have multiplied in Mbomou, Haut-Mbomou and Haute-Kotto affecting in particular mining areas in Haute-Kotto. These attacks have involved looting, violence against civilians, destruction of property and abductions. They have led to displacements of the population, including around 700 people who have sought refuge in Bria. - 2016-03-07"; Резолюція РБ ООН 2127 (2013) - 2018-10-16; 中央アフリカ共和国における平和等を損なう行為等に関与した者等(団体及びその他のグループ) - 2016-04-01 - 2020-02-28 | | Fuente : | Argentina RePET Sanctions; Australian Sanctions Consolidated List; Belgian Financial Sanctions; EU Council Official Journal Sanctioned Entities; EU Financial Sanctions Files (FSF); French National Asset Freezing System; Hong Kong Targeted Financial Sanctions (Cap. 537); Japan Economic Sanctions and List of Eligible People; Monaco National Fund Freezing List; PermID Open Data; South Africa Targeted Financial Sanctions; Swiss SECO Sanctions/Embargoes; Taiwan Strategic High-Tech Commodities Entity List; UK FCDO Sanctions List; UN Security Council Consolidated Sanctions; US Department of State Terrorist Exclusion; US OFAC Press Releases; US OFAC Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) List; US SAM Procurement Exclusions; US Trade Consolidated Screening List (CSL); Ukraine SFMS Blacklist | | Fecha : | 2026-11-03T17:55:05 |
Ali Yagoub Gibril
| Nombre : | Ali Yagoub Gibril | | Alias : | Ali Yagoub JIBRIL; Ali Yagoub Jibril; Ali Yaqoub JIBRIL; Ali Yaqoub Jibril; GIBRIL, Ali Yagoub | | Fecha de nacimiento : | 1964-01-01 | | País : | sd | | Sanciones : | Reciprocal - Active - 2024-05-15; SUDAN-EO14098 - Executive Order 14098 (Sudan) | | Fuente : | US OFAC Press Releases; US OFAC Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) List; US SAM Procurement Exclusions; US Trade Consolidated Screening List (CSL) | | Fecha : | 2026-07-16T07:17:05 |
GSK Advance Company Ltd
| Nombre : | GSK Advance Company Ltd | | Alias : | GSK Advance; GSK Advance Co. Ltd; GSK Advance Co. Ltd. and GSK for Advanced Business Co. Ltd.; GSK Advance Company LTD; GSK Advance Company Ltd.; GSK Advanced Business Co Ltd; GSK FOR ADVANCED BUSINESS CO. LTD; GSK for Advanced Business Co. Ltd; Gsk Advance Co Ltd; شركة جي أس كيه أدفانس كومباني لميتد | | País : | sd | | Dirección : | AHMED KHAIR STREET, 11111 KHARTOUM; Ahmed Khair Street, 11111 Khartoum; Ahmed Khair Street, 11111 Khartoum, SUDAN; Ahmed Khair Street, 11111 Khartoum, Sudan; Ahmed Khair Street, Khartoum 11111; Ahmed Khair Street, Khartoum 11111, Soudan; Ahmed Khair Street, Khartoum 11111, Sudan; Ahmed Khair Street, Khartoum, Sudan, 11111; Sudan (North) | | Sanciones : | (UE) 2024/384 du 22/01/2024 (UE Soudan - Activités compromettant la stabilité et la transition politique - R (UE) 2023/2147) - GSK est une société soudanaise dans le domaine des technologies de l'information et de la sécurité, qui est détenue, à 60 % de l'actionnariat, par Algoney Hamdan Dagalo, commandant au sein des FSR et le plus jeune frère de Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemedti). GSK fait du réseau commercial des FSR qui génère un revenu stable pour les FSR leur permettant de financer et de poursuivre le conflit au Soudan. Elle est utilisée par les FSR comme société écran, facilitant les flux de liquidités vers les FSR et impliquée dans les procédures de passation de marchés des FSR. En outre, depuis au moins 2019, GSK travaille avec Aviatrade LLC, une entreprise d'approvisionnement militaire établie en Russie, pour l'achat et la fourniture de matériel et d’équipements au profit des FSR, y compris la formation correspondante, et pour l’achat et la fourniture de véhicules aériens sans pilote, d’équipements de surveillance et de pièces détachées. Des drones de reconnaissance et piégés sont utilisés par les FSR dans le conflit au Soudan. Par conséquent, GSK Advance Company LTD apporte un soutien aux actions des FSR qui menacent la paix, la stabilité et la sécurité du Soudan.; 2024/384 (OJ L22012024); GSK est une société soudanaise dans le domaine des technologies de l'information et de la sécurité, qui est détenue, à 60 % de l'actionnariat, par Algoney Hamdan Dagalo, commandant au sein des FSR et le plus jeune frère de Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemedti). GSK fait du réseau commercial des FSR qui génère un revenu stable pour les FSR leur permettant de financer et de poursuivre le conflit au Soudan. Elle est utilisée par les FSR comme société écran, facilitant les flux de liquidités vers les FSR et impliquée dans les procédures de passation de marchés des FSR. En outre, depuis au moins 2019, GSK travaille avec Aviatrade LLC, une entreprise d'approvisionnement militaire établie en Russie, pour l'achat et la fourniture de matériel et d’équipements au profit des FSR, y compris la formation correspondante, et pour l’achat et la fourniture de véhicules aériens sans pilote, d’équipements de surveillance et de pièces détachées. Des drones de reconnaissance et piégés sont utilisés par les FSR dans le conflit au Soudan. Par conséquent, GSK Advance Company LTD apporte un soutien aux actions des FSR qui menacent la paix, la stabilité et la sécurité du Soudan.; GSK is a Sudan-based information technology and security company, which is 60 % owned by RSF Major Algoney Hamdan Dagalo, the youngest brother of Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemedti). GSK is part of the RSF’s commercial network which generates stable revenue for the RSF enabling them to finance and continue the conflict in Sudan. It is used by the RSF as a front company, facilitating cash flows into the RSF and being involved in the RSF’s procurement processes. In addition, since at least 2019, GSK has been working with Aviatrade LLC, a Russia-based military supply company, on the purchase and supply of material and equipment for the benefit of the RSF, including the corresponding training, and on the purchase and supply of unmanned aerial vehicles, monitoring equipment and spare parts. Reconnaissance and weaponised drones are used by the RSF in the conflict in Sudan. Therefore, GSK Advance Company LTD provides support for RSF actions that threaten the peace, stability and security of Sudan. - 2024-01-22; Ordinance of 25 May 2005 on measures against Sudan (SR 946.231.18) - 2024-04-10; Reciprocal - Active - 2023-09-28; SDNZ - 2024/384 (OJ L22012024) - 2024-01-22; SUDAN-EO14098 - Executive Order 14098 (Sudan); Sudan / Soudan - Part 2 - 2024-04-12; "The Sudan (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2020 - GSK is an involved person under the Sudan (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2020. GSK is associated with RSF, an ‘involved person’ fighting for power in Sudan. GSK is one of RSF’s ‘front companies’ and is controlled by the head of RSF’s brother. RSF is an armed group and GSK supports it with funds and goods and equipment to fight. GSK provides funds for activity which threatens the peace, stability and security of Sudan, as an enabler of RSF’s participation in the conflict in Sudan. GSK is an involved person responsible for activity which threatens the peace, stability and security of Sudan. - GSK is an involved person under the Sudan (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2020. GSK is associated with RSF, an ‘involved person’ fighting for power in Sudan. GSK is one of RSF’s ‘front companies’ and is controlled by the head of RSF’s brother. RSF is an armed group and GSK supports it with funds and goods and equipment to fight. GSK provides funds for activity which threatens the peace, stability and security of Sudan, as an enabler of RSF’s participation in the conflict in Sudan. GSK is an involved person responsible for activity which threatens the peace, stability and security of Sudan. - 2023-07-12"; description_identifier: disqualification under sanctions regulation - section: 3A - act: sanctions anti money laundering act 2018 - 2025-04-09 | | Teléfono : | 249930020401 | | Fuente : | Belgian Financial Sanctions; Canadian Consolidated Autonomous Sanctions List; EU Council Official Journal Sanctioned Entities; EU Financial Sanctions Files (FSF); French National Asset Freezing System; Monaco National Fund Freezing List; PermID Open Data; Swiss SECO Sanctions/Embargoes; UK Companies House Disqualified Directors; UK FCDO Sanctions List; US OFAC Press Releases; US OFAC Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) List; US SAM Procurement Exclusions; US Trade Consolidated Screening List (CSL) | | Fecha : | 2026-09-15T09:48:57 |
Mohamed EL AWAD EL AMIN EL TAHIR
| Nombre : | Mohamed EL AWAD EL AMIN EL TAHIR | | Alias : | Al-Awad Al-Amin Mohammed; El Taher Mohamed El Awad; El Tahir Mohamed El Awad El Amin; El Tahir Mohamed El Awad El Amin Al-Taher; Mohamed EL AWAD EL AMIN AL-TAHER; Mohamed EL TAHIR; Mohamed EL TAHIR EL AWAD EL AMIN; Mohamed El Awad El Amin Al-Taher; Mohamed El Awad El Amin El Tahir; Mohamed El Tahir El Awad El Amin; Mohammed AL-AWAD AL-AMIN; Mohammed Al-Awad Al-Amin; الطاهر محمد العوض الامين | | País : | sd | | Sanciones : | "(UE) 2024/1783 du 24/06/2024 (UE Soudan - Activités compromettant la stabilité et la transition politique - R (UE) 2023/2147) - Personnes associées: Général Abdelfattah Al-Burhan, commandant suprême des FAS; Lieutenant-général Yasir al-Atta, commandant en chef adjoint des FAS; Général Mohamed Osman al-Hussein, chef d’état-major des forces terrestres des FAS - Entité associée: FAS - El Tahir Mohamed El Awad El Amin est un lieutenant-général des FAS et le commandant de l’armée de l’air soudanaise depuis le 1er septembre 2022. Il est donc responsable des opérations menées par l’armée de l’air des FAS depuis le déclenchement du conflit entre les FAS, les FSR et leurs milices affiliées, le 15 avril 2023, comme le souligne sa participation à des réunions à haut niveau, rendues publiques, rassemblant des commandants de haut rang des FAS, présidées par le commandant en chef Abdelfattah Al-Burhan au quartier général des FAS à Khartoum en mai et juillet 2023. El Tahir Mohamed El Awad El Amin a dès lors une responsabilité directe dans le commandement des bombardements aériens sans discrimination perpétrés par l’armée de l’air des FAS dans des zones résidentielles densément peuplées, notamment à Khartoum, Omdurman, Nyala (Darfour du Sud) et au Kordofan du Nord, documentés par la Mission intégrée des Nations Unies pour l’assistance à la transition au Soudan (MINUATS) dans ses rapports du 31 août 2023 et du 13 novembre 2023 adressés au Secrétaire général, par le Haut-Commissaire des Nations unies aux droits de l’homme dans son rapport du 22 février 2024 et par le groupe d’experts des Nations unies sur le Soudan dans son rapport du 15 janvier 2024. El Tahir Mohamed El Awad El Amin participe donc directement à la poursuite du conflit soudanais, qui menace la paix, la stabilité et la sécurité du Soudan, et participe à la planification, à la direction et à la réalisation d’opérations aériennes qui ont entraîné de graves violations des droits de l’homme et des violations du droit international humanitaire en causant un grand nombre de victimes civiles, entraînant le déplacement de la population civile et la destruction d’infrastructures critiques, y compris d’installations médicales telles que l’hôpital du Nil oriental à Khartoum en mai 2023 et l’hôpital pédiatrique Babiker Nahar à El-Fasher en mai 2024."; 2024/1783 (OJ L24062024); Council Decision concerning restrictive measures in view of activities undermining the stability and political transition of Sudan; "El Tahir Mohamed El Awad El Amin est un lieutenant-général des FAS et le commandant de l’armée de l’air soudanaise depuis le 1er septembre 2022. Il est donc responsable des opérations menées par l’armée de l’air des FAS depuis le déclenchement du conflit entre les FAS, les FSR et leurs milices affiliées, le 15 avril 2023, comme le souligne sa participation à des réunions à haut niveau, rendues publiques, rassemblant des commandants de haut rang des FAS, présidées par le commandant en chef Abdelfattah Al-Burhan au quartier général des FAS à Khartoum en mai et juillet 2023. El Tahir Mohamed El Awad El Amin a dès lors une responsabilité directe dans le commandement des bombardements aériens sans discrimination perpétrés par l’armée de l’air des FAS dans des zones résidentielles densément peuplées, notamment à Khartoum, Omdurman, Nyala (Darfour du Sud) et au Kordofan du Nord, documentés par la Mission intégrée des Nations Unies pour l’assistance à la transition au Soudan (MINUATS) dans ses rapports du 31 août 2023 et du 13 novembre 2023 adressés au Secrétaire général, par le Haut-Commissaire des Nations unies aux droits de l’homme dans son rapport du 22 février 2024 et par le groupe d’experts des Nations unies sur le Soudan dans son rapport du 15 janvier 2024. El Tahir Mohamed El Awad El Amin participe donc directement à la poursuite du conflit soudanais, qui menace la paix, la stabilité et la sécurité du Soudan, et participe à la planification, à la direction et à la réalisation d’opérations aériennes qui ont entraîné de graves violations des droits de l’homme et des violations du droit international humanitaire en causant un grand nombre de victimes civiles, entraînant le déplacement de la population civile et la destruction d’infrastructures critiques, y compris d’installations médicales telles que l’hôpital du Nil oriental à Khartoum en mai 2023 et l’hôpital pédiatrique Babiker Nahar à El-Fasher en mai 2024."; El Tahir Mohamed El Awad El Amin is a Lieutenant General in the SAF and Commander of the Sudanese Air Force since 1 September 2022. He is therefore in charge of the operations carried out by the Air Force of the SAF since the outbreak of the conflict between the SAF, the RSF and their allied militias on 15 April 2023, as underscored by his participation in publicly disclosed high-level meetings of senior commanders of the SAF headed by the Commander-in-Chief Abdelfattah Al-Burhan in the General Command of the SAF in Khartoum in May and July 2023. El Tahir Mohamed El Awad El Amin therefore holds a direct command responsibility in the indiscriminate aerial bombing carried out by the Air Force of the SAF in densely populated residential areas, notably in Khartoum, Omdurman, Nyala (South Darfur) and in North Kordofan, documented by the United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan (UNITAMS) in its 31 August 2023 and 13 November 2023 reports to the Secretary-General, by the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights in its 22 February 2024 report and by the United Nations Panel of Experts on Sudan in its 15 January 2024 report. El Tahir Mohamed El Awad El Amin has thus been engaged directly in the continuation of the Sudanese conflict, which threatens the peace, stability and security of Sudan, and has been involved in planning, directing and committing aerial operations which have resulted in serious human rights violations and violations of international humanitarian law by causing high numbers of civilian casualties, leading to displacement of the civilian population and to the destruction of critical infrastructures, including medical facilities such as the East Nile Hospital in Khartoum in May 2023 and the Babiker Nahar Paediatric Hospital in El-Fasher in May 2024. - 2024-06-24; Ordinance of 25 May 2005 on measures against Sudan (SR 946.231.18) - 2024-07-09; SDNZ - 2024/1783 (OJ L24062024) - 2024-06-24; Sudan / Soudan - Part 1 - 2025-03-05 | | Fuente : | Belgian Financial Sanctions; Canadian Consolidated Autonomous Sanctions List; EU Consolidated Travel Bans; EU Council Official Journal Sanctioned Entities; EU Financial Sanctions Files (FSF); French National Asset Freezing System; Monaco National Fund Freezing List; Swiss SECO Sanctions/Embargoes | | Fecha : | 2026-09-15T09:48:57 |
Red Rock Ltd
| Nombre : | Red Rock Ltd | | Alias : | Red Rock Mining Company | | País : | ae; sd | | Dirección : | Blok 9 Kafory, Khartoum, Sudan; Blok 9, Kafory, Khartoum; Blok 9, Kafory, Khartoum, SUDAN; Blok 9, Kafory, Khartoum, Sudan; Office 320, Emarat Atrium Building, Business Bay, Dubai, United Arab Emirates; Office 320, Emarat Atrium Building, Business Bay, Dubaï; Office 320, Emarat Atrium Building, Business Bay, Dubaï, Émirats arabes unis; Office 320, Emarat Atrium Building, Business Bay, Dudai, UNITED ARAB EMIRATES; United Arab Emirates | | Sanciones : | (UE) 2025/1480 du 18/07/2025 (UE Soudan - Activités compromettant la stabilité et la transition politique - R (UE) 2023/2147) - Personnes ou entités associées: SMT Engineering - Red Rock Mining Company est une société minière et d'exploration. Sa société mère est SMT Engineering, qui fait l'objet de mesures restrictives de la part de l'Union, des États-Unis et du Royaume-Uni. SMT est un coactionnaire majeur, aux côtés de Defense Industries System (DIS), dans trois entreprises impliquées dans la production d'armes et de véhicules pour les forces armées soudanaises (FAS). Le secteur minier joue un rôle particulièrement important dans les conflits. Les régions minières sont souvent liées à des zones de guerre et constituent des sites stratégiquement importants à conquérir pour les parties à un conflit, en augmentant la concurrence et les tensions. Red Rock Mining Company est présente et active au Soudan. Elle possède en outre une concession près d'al Damazin, qui a été reprise par les FAS en 2012. Red Rock Mining Company est une source de financement pour les groupes armés à l'origine du conflit soudanais, en particulier pour les FAS. Red Rock Mining Company est actionnaire à 99 % d'Advanced Mining Works, qui fait partie du réseau multisectoriel de sociétés et de participations dirigé par la société-mère GIAD. GIAD est, entre autres, impliquée dans la production d'armes et de véhicules pour les FAS, ainsi que dans la fourniture de services. Le conglomérat GIAD est contrôlé par les FAS via DIS. Red Rock Mining Company est donc une entité apportant un soutien à des actions ou politiques qui menacent la paix, la stabilité et la sécurité du Soudan. Elle est en outre associée à des personnes et entités désignées.; 2025/1480 (OJ L202501480); Ordinance of 25 May 2005 on measures against Sudan (SR 946.231.18) - 2025-08-20; "Red Rock Mining Company est une société minière et d’exploration. Sa société mère est SMT Engineering, qui fait l’objet de mesures restrictives de la part de l’Union, des États-Unis et du Royaume-Uni. SMT est un coactionnaire majeur, aux côtés de Defense Industries System (DIS), dans trois entreprises impliquées dans la production d’armes et de véhicules pour les forces armées soudanaises (FAS). Le secteur minier joue un rôle particulièrement important dans les conflits. Les régions minières sont souvent liées à des zones de guerre et constituent des sites stratégiquement importants à conquérir pour les parties à un conflit, en augmentant la concurrence et les tensions. Red Rock Mining Company est présente et active au Soudan. Elle possède en outre une concession près d’al Damazin, qui a été reprise par les FAS en 2012. Red Rock Mining Company est une source de financement pour les groupes armés à l’origine du conflit soudanais, en particulier pour les FAS. Red Rock Mining Company est actionnaire à 99 % d’Advanced Mining Works, qui fait partie du réseau multisectoriel de sociétés et de participations dirigé par la société-mère GIAD. GIAD est, entre autres, impliquée dans la production d’armes et de véhicules pour les FAS, ainsi que dans la fourniture de services. Le conglomérat GIAD est contrôlé par les FAS via DIS. Red Rock Mining Company est donc une entité apportant un soutien à des actions ou politiques qui menacent la paix, la stabilité et la sécurité du Soudan. Elle est en outre associée à des personnes et entités désignées."; Red Rock Mining Company is a mining and exploration company. Its parent company is SMT Engineering (SMT), which is subject to restrictive measures by the Union, the United States and the United Kingdom. SMT is a major joint shareholder, along with the Defense Industries System (DIS), in three companies involved in the production of weapons and vehicles for the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF). The mining sector is of particular importance for the fuelling of conflict. Mining areas are often linked to war zones and represent strategically important sites to conquer for the conflict parties, increasing competition and tensions. Red Rock Mining Company is present and active in Sudan. It further holds a concession near al Damazin, which was taken over by the SAF in 2012. Red Rock Mining Company provides funding to the armed groups behind the Sudanese conflict, most prominently to the SAF. Red Rock Mining Company has a 99 % shareholding in Advanced Mining Works, which is part of the multi-sectoral network of corporations and shareholdings headed by the parent company GIAD. GIAD is involved, among others, in the production of weapons and vehicles for SAF, as well as in the provision of services. The GIAD conglomerate is controlled by the SAF via the DIS. Red Rock Mining Company is therefore an entity providing support to actions or policies that threaten the peace, stability and security of Sudan. It is also associated with designated individuals and entities. - 2025-07-18; SDNZ - 2025/1480 (OJ L202501480) - 2025-07-18; "The Sudan (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2020 - Red Rock Mining Company is an involved person under the Sudan (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2020 (i) through its association with Sudan Master Technology; and (ii) Red Rock Mining Company is itself responsible for action, policy or activity which threatens the peace, stability and security of Sudan because it has played a central role in funding one of the main parties to the conflict, the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF). - 2024-04-15"; description_identifier: disqualification under sanctions regulation - section: 3A - act: sanctions anti money laundering act 2018 - 2025-04-09 | | Teléfono : | 249120347711 | | Email : | corporate@redrockmining.net; info@redrocksd.com | | Fuente : | Belgian Financial Sanctions; EU Council Official Journal Sanctioned Entities; EU Financial Sanctions Files (FSF); French National Asset Freezing System; Monaco National Fund Freezing List; Swiss SECO Sanctions/Embargoes; UK Companies House Disqualified Directors; UK FCDO Sanctions List | | Fecha : | 2026-09-15T09:48:57 |
Mohamed Makawi Ibrahim MOHAMED
| Nombre : | Mohamed Makawi Ibrahim MOHAMED | | Alias : | IBRAHIM, Muhammad Makkawi; MAKAWI, Mohamed; MOHAMED, Mohamed Makawi Ibrahim; MOHAMED, Mohamed Makkawi Ibrahim; Mohamed MAKAWI; Mohamed Makkawi Ibrahim MOHAMED; Muhammad Makkawi IBRAHIM | | Fecha de nacimiento : | 1984 | | País : | sd | | Sanciones : | Reciprocal - Active; SDGT - Executive Order 13224 (Terrorism) | | Fuente : | Taiwan Strategic High-Tech Commodities Entity List; US OFAC Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) List; US SAM Procurement Exclusions; US Trade Consolidated Screening List (CSL) | | Fecha : | 2026-07-11T07:55:01 |
AWAD WAIL
| Nombre : | AWAD WAIL | | Alias : | WAIL AWAD | | Fecha de nacimiento : | 1972-07-03 | | País : | pl; sd | | Sanciones : | "participation in terrorist organisation ""Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant"" (ISIS). illegal possession of firearm punishable threat" | | Fuente : | INTERPOL Red Notices; Poland Wanted Persons | | Fecha : | 2026-08-06T13:17:13 |
Ports Engineering Company Ltd
| Nombre : | Ports Engineering Company Ltd | | Alias : | شركة الموانئ الهندسية المحدودة | | País : | sd | | Dirección : | Port Sudan | | Sanciones : | SUDAN-EO14098 - Executive Order 14098 (Sudan) | | Fuente : | US OFAC Press Releases; US OFAC Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) List; US Trade Consolidated Screening List (CSL) | | Fecha : | 2026-07-16T07:17:05 |
Rifa'i Ahmad Taha MUSA
| Nombre : | Rifa'i Ahmad Taha MUSA | | Alias : | 'ABD ALLAH, 'Issam 'Ali Muhammad; 'ABD-AL-'IZ; 'Issam 'Ali Muhammad 'ABD ALLAH; ABD-AL-WAHAB, Abd-al-Hai Ahmad; ABU YASIR; AL-KAMEL, Salah 'Ali; Abd-al-Hai Ahmad ABD-AL-WAHAB; Issam 'Ali Muhammad 'ABD ALLAH; MUSA, Rifa'i Ahmad Taha; Rifa'i Ahmad TAHA MUSA; Salah 'Ali AL-KAMEL; TAHA MUSA, Rifa'i Ahmad; THABIT 'IZ | | Fecha de nacimiento : | 1954-06-24 | | País : | eg; sd; us | | Sanciones : | Reciprocal - Active; SDGT - Executive Order 13224 (Terrorism) | | Fuente : | Taiwan Strategic High-Tech Commodities Entity List; US OFAC Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) List; US SAM Procurement Exclusions; US Trade Consolidated Screening List (CSL) | | Fecha : | 2026-07-11T07:55:01 |
Al-Imam Joda Al-Tayyib
| Nombre : | Al-Imam Joda Al-Tayyib | | Alias : | Al-Imam Dzhoda At-Taiyib; Al-Tayyib Al-Imam Joda; Аль-Імам Джода Ат-Тайїб | | País : | sd | | Sanciones : | "(UE) 2026/251 (UE Soudan - Activités compromettant la stabilité et la transition politique - R (UE) 2023/2147) - Entités associées: FAS; forces du bouclier soudanais; tribu Kawahla; clan Nafeidiya. Al-Tayyib Al-Imam Joda est l’émir du clan Nafeidiya de la tribu Kawahla, de la zone de Sarhan, à l’ouest de l’État de Gezirah. Il a fait partie des chefs de communauté ayant aidé les forces armées soudanaises (FAS) et les milices alliées, en particulier les forces du bouclier soudanais, à recruter et à organiser la campagne de ciblage systématique des communautés agricoles kanabi dans les États de Gezirah et de Sennar, campagne dans le cadre de laquelle des arrestations et tueries de masse ont eu lieu, des fosses communes ont été creusées et des villages ont été incendiés, notamment avant et après la reprise de la ville de Wad Madani par les FAS et leurs alliés en janvier 2025. Al-Tayyib Al-Imam Joda a exprimé son soutien sans réserve aux forces du bouclier soudanais, groupe paramilitaire allié des FAS dirigé par Abu Aqla Mohamed Kaikal qui a commis de graves violations des droits de l’homme dans l’État de Gezirah. Al-Tayyib Al-Imam Joda a appelé à plusieurs reprises à armer la population civile, a recruté des combattants pour le compte des FAS et des forces du bouclier soudanais, et a incité à la violence contre le peuple kanabi en l’accusant de soutenir les Forces de soutien rapide (FSR). Al-Tayyib Al-Imam Joda a donc contribué à planifier, diriger et commettre des actes au Soudan qui constituent de graves violations des droits de l’homme et qui compromettent directement les efforts déployés pour la reprise de la transition politique au Soudan."; 2026/251 (OJ L202600251); 448/2026 - рішення та регламенти Ради Європейського Союзу щодо забезпечення національних інтересів та національної безпеки України - active - 2026-05-29 - 2036-05-29; "Al-Tayyib Al-Imam Joda est l’émir du clan Nafeidiya de la tribu Kawahla, de la zone de Sarhan, à l’ouest de l’État de Gezirah. Il a fait partie des chefs de communauté ayant aidé les forces armées soudanaises (FAS) et les milices alliées, en particulier les forces du bouclier soudanais, à recruter et à organiser la campagne de ciblage systématique des communautés agricoles kanabi dans les États de Gezirah et de Sennar, campagne dans le cadre de laquelle des arrestations et tueries de masse ont eu lieu, des fosses communes ont été creusées et des villages ont été incendiés, notamment avant et après la reprise de la ville de Wad Madani par les FAS et leurs alliés en janvier 2025. Al-Tayyib Al-Imam Joda a exprimé son soutien sans réserve aux forces du bouclier soudanais, groupe paramilitaire allié des FAS dirigé par Abu Aqla Mohamed Kaikal qui a commis de graves violations des droits de l’homme dans l’État de Gezirah. Al-Tayyib Al-Imam Joda a appelé à plusieurs reprises à armer la population civile, a recruté des combattants pour le compte des FAS et des forces du bouclier soudanais, et a incité à la violence contre le peuple kanabi en l’accusant de soutenir les Forces de soutien rapide (FSR). Al-Tayyib Al-Imam Joda a donc contribué à planifier, diriger et commettre des actes au Soudan qui constituent de graves violations des droits de l’homme et qui compromettent directement les efforts déployés pour la reprise de la transition politique au Soudan."; Al-Tayyib Al-Imam Joda is the Emir of the Nafeidiya clan of the Kawahla tribe from the Sarhan area west of Gezirah State. He was among the community leaders who assisted the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and allied militias, in particular the Sudan Shield Forces, in recruiting and organising the campaign of systematic targeting of Kanabi farming communities in Gezirah and Sennar States, which included mass arrests, mass killings, mass graves and burned villages, notably before and after the recapture of Wad Madani by the SAF and their allies in January 2025. Al-Tayyib Al-Imam Joda expressed his full support for the Sudan Shield Forces, a paramilitary group allied to the SAF, headed by Abu Aqla Mohamed Kaikal which has committed serious human rights violations in Gezirah State. Al-Tayyib Al-Imam Joda has repeatedly called for the arming of the civilian population, has recruited combatants on behalf of the SAF and the Sudan Shield Forces, and has incited violence against the Kanabi people by accusing them of siding with the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). Al-Tayyib Al-Imam Joda has therefore been involved in planning, directing and committing acts in Sudan that constitute serious human rights violations and that directly undermine efforts to resume the political transition in Sudan. - 2026-01-29; Ordinance of 25 May 2005 on measures against Sudan (SR 946.231.18) - 2026-02-18; SDNZ - 2026/251 (OJ L202600251) - 2026-01-29 | | Fuente : | Belgian Financial Sanctions; EU Council Official Journal Sanctioned Entities; EU Financial Sanctions Files (FSF); French National Asset Freezing System; Monaco National Fund Freezing List; Swiss SECO Sanctions/Embargoes; Ukraine NSDC State Register of Sanctions | | Fecha : | 2026-09-15T09:48:57 |
Mohamed Atta Emoula Abbas
| Nombre : | Mohamed Atta Emoula Abbas | | Alias : | ABBAS, Mohamed Atta Emoula; Mohamed Atta Al-Mawla; Mohamed Atta Elmoula Abbas; Mohamed Atta Emoula; Mohamed Attta AL-MAWLA; Mohamed Attta al-Mawla; Muhammad 'Ata-al-Mawla 'ABBAS; Muhammad 'Ata-al-Mawla 'Abbas; Muhammad Ata-al-Mawla; محمد عطا المولى عباس | | Fecha de nacimiento : | 1957-04-27 | | País : | sd | | Dirección : | KHARTOUM; Kafouri 9, Khartoum | | Sanciones : | Reciprocal - Active - 2023-12-04; SUDAN-EO14098 - Executive Order 14098 (Sudan); Sudan / Soudan - Part 1 - 2025-03-05 | | Fuente : | Canadian Consolidated Autonomous Sanctions List; US OFAC Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) List; US SAM Procurement Exclusions; US Trade Consolidated Screening List (CSL) | | Fecha : | 2026-07-11T07:55:01 |
Algoney Hamdan Daglo Musa
| Nombre : | Algoney Hamdan Daglo Musa | | Alias : | Al-Goney Hamdan DAGALO; Al-Goney Hamdan Dagalo; Al-Gony Hamdan Dagalo; Al-Qoni Hamdan; Al-Qoni Hamdan DAGALO; Al-Qoni Hamdan Dagalo; Al-Qoni Hamdan Daglo; Al-Qoni Hamdan Daglo Mousa; Al-qoni Hamdan DAGALO; Algoney Hamdan; Algoney Hamdan DAGALO; Algoney Hamdan Dagalo; Algoney Hamdan Dagalo Musa; Algoney Hamdan Daglo Mousa; Algoney Hamdan Daglo Musa Musa Ahmed; Algoney Hamdane Dagalo Moussa; Algoney Hamdane Daglo Moussa; Algoney Hamdane Daglo Musa; Algoni Hamdan Daglo Musa; Algony Hamdan DAGALO MUSA; DAGALO, Al-Goney Hamdan; Dagalo Hamdan Al-Goney; Dagalo Musa Algony Hamdan; Dahalo Musa Alhoni Khamdan; El Gouni; Gony Hamdan Dagallo; MUSA, Algoney Hamdan Daglo; Musa Ahmed; Алгоні Хамдан Дагло Муса Муса Ахмед; Дагало Муса Алгоні Хамдан; القوني حمدان دقلو موسى; アルゴニー・ハムダン・ダガロ; アル=コニ・ハムダン・ダガロ; アル=ゴニー・ハムダン・ダガロ | | Fecha de nacimiento : | 1964-05-22; 1990-08-07; 1990-08-09 | | País : | ae; ke; sd | | Dirección : | DUBAI; Dubai; Dubai United Arab Emirates; Dubai,; Dubai, United Arab Emirates; Dubaï, EMIRATS ARABES UNIS; United Arab Emirates; Unknown Dubai United Arab Emirates; アラブ首長国連邦; ドバイ、; ドバイ、アラブ首長国連邦 | | Sanciones : | (UE) 2026/1393 du 22/06/2026 (ONU Soudan - RCSNU 1591 (2005) et R (UE) 747/2014) - décision du comité des sanctions des Nations unies du 28/04/2026 (ONU Soudan - RCSNU 1591 (2005) et R (UE) 747/2014) - Al-Goney Hamdan Dagalo a été inscrit sur la liste le 28 avril 2026 en application du point 3, c), de la résolution 1591 (2005). - Al-Goney Hamdan Dagalo (Al-Goney) fait l'objet d'une désignation pour s'être livré à des actions ou à des politiques qui menacent la paix, la sécurité ou la stabilité au Darfour. Al-Gomey est le directeur des achats des Forces de soutien rapide (FSR) et le frère de Mohammed Hamdan “Hemedti” Dagalo, le chef des FSR. Al-Goney a prolongé le conflit en dirigeant les efforts des FSR pour se procurer des armes et du matériel militaire. En armant les FSR, ses actions ont directement contribué au siège que mènent actuellement les FSR contre El Fasher, au Darfour du Nord, une ville qui compte près de deux millions de civils vulnérables, ainsi qu'aux opérations menées par les FSR ailleurs au Soudan. Al-Goney a dirigé Tradive General Trading, une société-écran des FSR, qui a importé des véhicules au Soudan pour le compte des FSR.».; 1591 (Sudan) - 2026-05-08; 2026-04-28; 2026/251 (OJ L202600251); 448/2026 - рішення та регламенти Ради Європейського Союзу щодо забезпечення національних інтересів та національної безпеки України - active - 2026-05-29 - 2036-05-29; "Al-Goney Hamdan Dagalo (Al-Goney) fait l’objet d’une désignation pour s’être livré à des actions ou à des politiques qui menacent la paix, la sécurité ou la stabilité au Darfour. Al-Gomey est le directeur des achats des Forces de soutien rapide (FSR) et le frère de Mohammed Hamdan “Hemedti” Dagalo, le chef des FSR. Al-Goney a prolongé le conflit en dirigeant les efforts des FSR pour se procurer des armes et du matériel militaire. En armant les FSR, ses actions ont directement contribué au siège que mènent actuellement les FSR contre El Fasher, au Darfour du Nord, une ville qui compte près de deux millions de civils vulnérables, ainsi qu’aux opérations menées par les FSR ailleurs au Soudan. Al-Goney a dirigé Tradive General Trading, une société-écran des FSR, qui a importé des véhicules au Soudan pour le compte des FSR."; Al-Goney Hamdan Dagalo was listed on 28 April 2026 pursuant to paragraph 3 (c) of resolution 1591 (2005). Al-Goney Hamdan Dagalo (Al-Goney) is being designated for engaging in actions or policies that threaten the peace, security, or stability of Darfur. Al-Goney is the procurement director of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and a brother of Mohammed Hamdan ‘Hemedti’ Dagalo, the leader of the RSF. Al-Goney has extended this war by leading RSF efforts to procure weapons and military materiel. By arming the RSF, his actions have directly contributed to the RSF’s ongoing siege of El Fasher in North Darfur, a city of nearly two million vulnerable civilians, and the RSF’s operations elsewhere in Sudan. Al-Goney has controlled the RSF front company Tradive General Trading, which imported vehicles to Sudan on behalf of the RSF. - 2026-04-28; Ordinance of 25 May 2005 on measures against Sudan (SR 946.231.18) - 2026-04-28; Reciprocal - Active - 2024-10-08; SDNZ - 2026/251 (OJ L202600251) - 2026-01-29; SUDAN-EO14098 - Executive Order 14098 (Sudan); Sudan - 2026-04-28; Sudan / Soudan - Part 1 - 2025-02-06; The Sudan (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2020 - 2026-04-28; UN List - Sudan - 2026-04-28; РБ ООН (Комітет 1591 (2005)) - 2026-04-29; スーダンにおけるダルフール和平阻害関与者等 - https://www.interpol.int/en/How-we-work/Notices/View-UN-Notices-Individuals - 性別:男性。インターポール・国連安全保障理事会特別手配ウェブリンク: - 2026-06-05 | | Fuente : | Argentina RePET Sanctions; Australian Sanctions Consolidated List; Belgian Financial Sanctions; Canadian Consolidated Autonomous Sanctions List; EU Council Official Journal Sanctioned Entities; EU Financial Sanctions Files (FSF); French National Asset Freezing System; Japan Economic Sanctions and List of Eligible People; Monaco National Fund Freezing List; South Africa Targeted Financial Sanctions; Swiss SECO Sanctions/Embargoes; Taiwan Strategic High-Tech Commodities Entity List; UK FCDO Sanctions List; UN Security Council Consolidated Sanctions; US OFAC Press Releases; US OFAC Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) List; US SAM Procurement Exclusions; US Trade Consolidated Screening List (CSL); Ukraine NSDC State Register of Sanctions; Ukraine SFMS Blacklist | | Fecha : | 2026-10-06T12:42:04 |
Abdel Moneim ABDEL BASSET
| Nombre : | Abdel Moneim ABDEL BASSET | | Alias : | Abdel ABDEL BASSET; Abdel Basset ABEL MONEIM; Abdel-Moneim ABDEL-BASIT | | País : | sd | | Sanciones : | The Sudan (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2020 - The Secretary of State has reasonable grounds to suspect that Abdel Moneim ABDEL BASSET is an involved person under the Sudan (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2020 because he is or has been involved in a relevant activity, namely being responsible for and providing support for the commission of violations of international humanitarian law in Sudan through his role as a Major General of the Sudanese Armed Forces during the systematic campaign of violence against civilians in Gezira State including against persons on the basis of their ethnicity or religious beliefs. - 2026-10-26; description_identifier: disqualification under sanctions regulation - section: 3A - act: sanctions anti money laundering act 2018 - 2026-10-26 | | Fuente : | UK Companies House Disqualified Directors; UK FCDO Sanctions List | | Fecha : | 2026-10-28T12:33:04 |
Tradive General Trading L.L.C
| Nombre : | Tradive General Trading L.L.C | | Alias : | MOTAH GENERAL TRADING, L.L.C.; Motah General Trading LLC; Motah General Trading, L.L.C.; TRADIVE GENERAL TRADING L.L.C.; Tradive General Trading; Tradive General Trading Co; Tradive General Trading LLC; تراديف للتجارة العامة; تريدف للتجارة العامة ذ | | País : | ae; sd | | Dirección : | P.O. BOX 86436, DUBAI; P.O. Box 86436 Dubai, United Arab Emirates; P.O. Box 86436, DUBAI, United Arab Emirates; P.O. Box 86436, Dubai; P.O. Box 86436, Dubai (UAE); P.O. Box 86436, Dubai, UNITED ARAB EMIRATES; P.O. Box 86436, Dubai, United Arab Emirates; P.O. Box 86436, Dubaï; P.O. Box 86436, Dubaï, Émirats arabes unis; United Arab Emirates | | Sanciones : | (UE) 2024/384 du 22/01/2024 (UE Soudan - Activités compromettant la stabilité et la transition politique - R (UE) 2023/2147) - Tradive General Trading Co (Tradive) est une société établie aux Émirats arabes unis dont le directeur et le bénéficiaire effectif ultime est Algoney Hamdan Dagalo, commandant au sein des Forces de soutien rapide (FSR) et plus jeune frère de Mohammed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemedti). Tradive fait partie du réseau commercial des FSR, qui génère des recettes stables pour les FSR, leur permettant de financer et de poursuivre le conflit au Soudan. Elle sert de société écran pour les FSR, avec lesquelles elle effectue d'importants transferts d'argent entrants et sortants, et rendant possible l'acquisition de matériel pour soutenir les opérations des FSR. Par exemple, Tradive a acheté des véhicules pour les FSR, dont des pick-ups Toyota Hilux et Land Cruiser, qui sont souvent transformés en “équipements techniques” très mobiles, lesquels sont des véhicules armés adaptés au désert. Au cours du premier semestre de 2019, plus de mille de ces véhicules ont été importés au Soudan depuis les Émirats arabes unis. Ces véhicules transformés sont utilisés depuis longtemps par les FSR et continuent de l'être dans le conflit au Soudan, en particulier pour effectuer des patrouilles dans les zones qu'elles contrôlent. Par conséquent, Tradive General Trading Co apporte un soutien aux actions des FSR qui menacent la paix, la stabilité et la sécurité du Soudan.; 2024/384 (OJ L22012024); Ordinance of 25 May 2005 on measures against Sudan (SR 946.231.18) - 2024-04-10; Reciprocal - Active - 2023-06-01; SDNZ - 2024/384 (OJ L22012024) - 2024-01-22; SUDAN-EO14098 - Executive Order 14098 (Sudan); Sudan / Soudan - Part 2 - 2025-03-05; "The Sudan (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2020 - Tradive General Trading LLC (TRADIVE) is an involved person under the Sudan (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2020, through its association with, support for and supply of the RSF with funds and supplies. The RSF, as a party to the conflict in Sudan, threatens the peace, stability and security of Sudan. TRADIVE is itself responsible for activity which threatens the peace, stability and security of Sudan because it funds and supplies one of the main parties to the conflict. - Tradive General Trading LLC (TRADIVE) is an involved person under the Sudan (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2020, through its association with, support for and supply of the RSF with funds and supplies. The RSF, as a party to the conflict in Sudan, threatens the peace, stability and security of Sudan. TRADIVE is itself responsible for activity which threatens the peace, stability and security of Sudan because it funds and supplies one of the main parties to the conflict. - 2023-07-12"; Tradive General Trading Co (Tradive) est une société établie aux Émirats arabes unis dont le directeur et le bénéficiaire effectif ultime est Algoney Hamdan Dagalo, commandant au sein des Forces de soutien rapide (FSR) et plus jeune frère de Mohammed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemedti). Tradive fait partie du réseau commercial des FSR, qui génère des recettes stables pour les FSR, leur permettant de financer et de poursuivre le conflit au Soudan. Elle sert de société écran pour les FSR, avec lesquelles elle effectue d'importants transferts d'argent entrants et sortants, et rendant possible l'acquisition de matériel pour soutenir les opérations des FSR. Par exemple, Tradive a acheté des véhicules pour les FSR, dont des pick-ups Toyota Hilux et Land Cruiser, qui sont souvent transformés en “équipements techniques” très mobiles, lesquels sont des véhicules armés adaptés au désert. Au cours du premier semestre de 2019, plus de mille de ces véhicules ont été importés au Soudan depuis les Émirats arabes unis. Ces véhicules transformés sont utilisés depuis longtemps par les FSR et continuent de l'être dans le conflit au Soudan, en particulier pour effectuer des patrouilles dans les zones qu'elles contrôlent. Par conséquent, Tradive General Trading Co apporte un soutien aux actions des FSR qui menacent la paix, la stabilité et la sécurité du Soudan.; Tradive General Trading Co (Tradive) is a company based in the UAE whose director and ultimate beneficial owner is RSF Major Algoney Hamdan Dagalo, the youngest brother of Mohammed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemedti). Tradive is part of the RSF’s commercial network which generates stable revenue for the RSF enabling them to finance and continue the conflict in Sudan. It is used as an RSF front company, channelling substantial sums into and out of the RSF, and enabling the purchase of material to support RSF operations. For instance, Tradive has purchased vehicles for the RSF, including Toyota Hilux and Land Cruiser pick-up trucks, which are often converted into highly mobile ‘technicals’, which are armed desert vehicles. In the first half of 2019, more than one thousand such vehicles were imported into Sudan from the UAE. These converted vehicles have been used by the RSF for a long time and continue to be used by it in the conflict in Sudan, in particular to patrol the areas under RSF control. Therefore, Tradive General Trading Co provides support for RSF actions that threaten the peace, stability and security of Sudan. - 2024-01-22; description_identifier: disqualification under sanctions regulation - section: 3A - act: sanctions anti money laundering act 2018 - 2025-04-09 | | Fuente : | Belgian Financial Sanctions; Canadian Consolidated Autonomous Sanctions List; EU Council Official Journal Sanctioned Entities; EU Financial Sanctions Files (FSF); French National Asset Freezing System; Monaco National Fund Freezing List; PermID Open Data; Swiss SECO Sanctions/Embargoes; UK Companies House Disqualified Directors; UK FCDO Sanctions List; US OFAC Press Releases; US OFAC Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) List; US SAM Procurement Exclusions; US Trade Consolidated Screening List (CSL) | | Fecha : | 2026-10-28T02:14:05 |
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